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The past 20 years have seen a great deal 
of progress in the US-India relationship. The 
non-aligned status of the Indian 
Government during the Cold War, and the 
US’s relationship with Pakistan, precluded a 
close partnership between the two 
countries, even if they shared similar 
political systems. The end of the Cold War 
brought new opportunities for the two democratic giants, as India 
liberalized its economic and trade policies and US presidents, 
starting with Bill Clinton, began to court the mercurial Asian 
power. President George W. Bush continued to develop the 
relationship by widening trade ties, making exceptions for India’s 
nuclear program through a more understanding interpretation of 
India’s place in American non-proliferation policy, and through an 
increase in defense ties that is beginning to truly bear fruit. The 
Obama Administration has continued to encourage strong 
diplomatic ties with the Indian state through its open and 
functional support of Indian efforts to secure a permanent seat on 
the United Nations Security Council and highly publicized 
bilateral initiatives and state visits. The relationship has continued 
to thrive amidst diplomatic impasses, economic stagnation, and 
political uncertainty.  
While the US-India relationship continues to develop on all 
fronts, the changing dynamics of global and regional relative power 
have increasingly highlighted the importance of India to the US’s 
foreign policy in Asia. With the new Indian Prime Minister, 
Narendra Modi, comes an opening for progress and innovation in 
US-Indian relations, in which an increase in economic and defense 
ties could act as a safeguard for the maintenance of the current 
regional order in Asia and, by extension, the global order 
implemented after the Second World War. In pursuit of a much 
closer relationship with India, the United States can approach the 
opportunity through many different long-term strategies, but 
questions concerning the formality of the relationship will 
consistently color the debate. Before the US and India can continue 
to develop ties, there must be a general framework that informs the 
nature of the relationship and the logic of its political and legal 
elements. In order to move forward in this vein, current and 
subsequent American presidential administrations must decide 
whether they want an informal partnership with India built on 
shared political values and regional interests, a relationship based 
on the codified aspects of bilateral and multilateral institutions and 
treaties, or a hybrid model, combining both legalistic and informal 
connections.  
 
A FLEXIBLE RELATIONSHIP 
Here, the United States could continue to expand its de facto 
defense and economic ties with the Indian government and 
encourage a melding of the two countries’ private sectors by 
actively lobbying for the removal of bi-lateral trade barriers. The 
US-India relationship has many inherent qualities that foster 
increased development of national connections without the 
formality of treaties and institutional overlays. In terms of informal 
defense ties, arms sales and limited technology transfers would 
feature heavily in the US-India security relationship. Sales of US 
weapons to India grew from $237 million in 2009 to $2 Billion in 
2013, surpassing Russia’s arms trade with India for the first time. In 
addition to arms sales, the Indian military conducts more military 
exercises with the United States than any other country. While 
these developments illustrate strengthening security ties between 
the two nations, they do not explicitly bind American foreign policy 
to that of India’s in the case of a regional conflict. Although, it does 
send a clear message to potential aggressors that the United States 
includes the South Asian giant in the calculations of its Asian-
Pacific interests.  
US defense ties to India also, in their current state, illustrate 
that American support of Indian security interests goes beyond 
rhetoric, but is not set in stone, thus providing the US government 
the opportunity to conduct a flexible national security policy. In 
keeping with this policy, arms sales and stipulated technology 
transfers should take precedence over formal ties like the Defense 
Framework Agreement, renewed this summer for an additional 10 
years. Economic relations should also maintain an informal quality, 
given the fact that Indian domestic interests don’t always suit the 
objectives of the American business community and are, at times, 
seemingly downright hostile to US efforts to encourage 
development.  
For example, the 2005 civil nuclear agreement has been stuck 
in somewhat of a holding pattern since the introduction of more 
stringent Indian liability laws. American companies are unwilling 
to invest and the economic opportunity afforded to the Indian state 
by the US deviation from its nuclear non-proliferation policies has 
been heretofore squandered. This is, of course, illustrative of the 
types of issues that come up in the relations of two democratic 
nations with complex domestic political systems that can often 
prove to make the alignment of priorities difficult, especially when 
the perceived welfare of their respective citizenry is involved. 
Nurturing an informal economic relationship, outside of trade 
treaties and multilateral trade agreements, gives the US options in 
how it approaches its economic relationship with India – which has 
been quite fruitful as a whole for US corporations – while giving 
both parties the ability to modify it in ways they deem fit.  
 
FULL COMMITMENT 
In this case, the US would actively pursue a 
formalization of all aspects of the U.S.-Indian relationship, 
across security and economic ties. This would allow for the 
A “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”  
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
OPTIONS FOR US-INDIA RELATIONS 
RYAN KUHNS 
2   
 
most expedient and meticulous promotion of a binding 
relationship between the two nations, and begin to codify an 
affiliation that could transform the geopolitical and economic 
direction of Asia in the 21st century. The consummation of this 
relationship lies in bilateral and multilateral agreements and 
treaties that would improve the strategic standing of both 
countries through increased cooperation in the areas of defense 
and trade. In formalizing the defense ties between India and the 
U.S., the first order of business has already been carried out, the 
renewal of the Defense Framework Agreement, which has been 
partially responsible for the enormous increase in US arms sales 
to India, and an impetus for the discussion of increased defense 
technology transfer and joint development. This agreement will 
include stepping up military-to-military contact at senior levels, 
collaboration on the orientation of joint communications and 
logistics, and joint strategic planning.  
While US-Indian cooperative statements on issues like 
terrorism and the South China Sea are productive and send a 
message about the stance of the two nations on important 
contemporary security issues, the provision of a legal status to the 
US-Indian defense relationship creates opportunities for 
projecting their respective national security interests into the 
future. It will not only provide an environment for the long-term 
strategy and operational planning of both the US and Indian 
national security establishments, but may also provide a solid 
context within which potential systemic usurpers may consider 
the increased costs of upsetting the international order. 
Formal security relationships make economic integration 
necessary, not just because of the implications for the efficiency of 
future activations of those security agreements, but also through 
fostering the long-term economic growth and cultural exchanges 
that accompany intensive trade relationships. These connections, 
outside of being lucrative in the absolute sense, then strengthen 
the agreements themselves through shared experience and mutual 
benefit. With this in mind, the US should work with the Indian 
government to conclude the bilateral investment treaty that has 
been on hold for over 10 years and look towards overcoming the 
obstacles to a bilateral free trade agreement. 
 
MIX AND MATCH 
The US could consider a combination of the two policies 
mentioned above, mixing and matching the formal and informal trade 
and security relationship with India as it deems fit for the national 
security and economic interests of the country. An informal trade 
policy with formal security ties to India will allow for a united Asian 
front to form without sacrificing additional diplomatic and political 
capital. The lack of formal economic ties will also spare both the US 
and Indian markets from unforeseen problems that could harm 
economic growth or good relations in general. Of course, formal allies 
that are economically linked might be better prepared for the 
complex resource sharing and coordinated production that makes a 
combined war effort easier to prosecute. In considering 
heterogeneous policy combinations, the pairing of formal trade links 
with an informal security partnership might make the most sense of 
the two combinations. This would create the opportunity for a 
melding of economic and political interests between the U.S. and 
India, while maintain strategic flexibility for both nations. 
SHAPING FUTURE ENDEAVORS 
The formal model would best suit the future geopolitical and 
economic interests of the United States and India. Formal trade and 
security links between the US and India will begin a process that 
has been made necessary by an increasingly complex international 
environment. A strong and legalistic US-Indian relationship will 
leave no doubt about the orientation of regional and global forces 
when it comes to the maintenance of the current order. It will 
manufacture the types of red-lines that send important signals to 
those who might test the structural integrity of that system. A 
codified security relationship, without sufficient economic ties, 
would be functionally weak. While there is a much stronger case to 
be made for the opposite configuration, the lack of a security 
element would preclude preparations to defend the mutual 
economic interests which would form in such a trade relationship 
between the US and India. A serious military threat to one country 
in this scenario would probably bring in the other nation anyways, 
given their closely associated economies
